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Introduction 
Students of Literature who read the Biographia Literaria: or Biographical 
Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions (1817), for Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge’s criticism of William Wordsworth’s poetry, or who try to make 
practical use of his Primary and Secondary Imaginations, go on bumping into 
bits of his philosophy which are supposed to open the door to his principles 
of criticism, but seem not to. The distinction between Fancy and Imagination 
does do some work, but is not novel. Most criticism in Aesthetics took it – 
more or less – as a given before Coleridge gave it a name. There were 
aesthetic judgements before Alexander Baumgarten ‘discovered’ Aesthetics: 
Plato’s were often silly, see for example, The Sophist; while Aristotle’s down 
to earth and useful. The Poetics and The Ethics are grounded. Think of 
Raphael’s The School of Athens, and the images of Plato and of the dissenting 
Aristotle. 
The Biographia Literaria is itself a series of “sketches,”1 mixing 
biography, criticism and philosophy in the manner of an unsystematic 
scrapbook; no neat folders as in a filing cabinet, but scissors and paste and 
the odd loose leaf. As for the philosophy in the Biographia Literaria 
Coleridge himself was unhappy about it. In the Specimens of the Table Talk 
of Samuel Taylor Coleridge for 28 June 1834 one finds this: 
The metaphysical disquisition at the end of the first volume of “Biographia 
Literaria” is unformed and immature; – it contains fragments of the truth, 
but is not fully thought out. It is wonderful to myself to think how infinitely 
more profound my views now are, and yet how much clearer they are 
 
 
Patrick Hutchings holds an honorary position at the University of Melbourne. 
1 Thomas McFarland (ed.) with the assistance of Nicholas Halmi, Opus Maximum, The 
Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Vol. 15, Series LXXV (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2002).  
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withal. The circle is completing; the idea is coming round to, be and to be, 
common sense.2 
There is a sad irony in “the idea is coming round” because “the metaphysical 
disquisition at the end of the first volume” in Chapter 12 of the Biographia 
Literaria can be seen at best as a circular argument, having no conclusion, 
true or false. 
The ‘truth’ whose fragments are to be found in the Opus Maximum, 
now available, I shall briefly sketch in the third and final section of this 
article. Coleridge attempted a large metaphysic of the mind and its unaided 
powers. Chapter XII of the Biographia Literaria resonates with but, does not 
reveal the full measure of Coleridge’s unachieved and unfinished 
metaphysic. Now that we have Thomas McFarland’s absolutely splendid 
edition of the Opus Maximum3 may we hope for the ‘truth’ of which the last 
chapter of the Biographia Literaria ‘contains the fragments’? The answer is: 
yes and no. No, if you are reading Coleridge simply to see how his 
philosophy underpins his critical practice. Yes, if you are interested in the 
history of ideas: Coleridge read a great deal of German Naturphilosophie, 
this was written on the cusp of largely non-empirical speculations on Nature 
and what today is real Natural Science. Coleridge once breakfasted with 
Humphry Davy, unfortunately before Davy had done the work which made 
him famous. However, Coleridge was interested in such real science as he 
encountered. In the twenty first century Naturphilosophie can be boring, as 
it has not much grasp on the actual facts of Nature. Yet, Coleridge hoped to 
understand then-current empirical science as well.4 
Most of all he hoped to produce a system as Schelling and Kant had. 
The Opus Maximum is – McFarland – only ‘the torso’ of one; and it is 
unfinished – probably unfinishable. For most people who have read him, 
‘Systematic Coleridge’ would seem an oxymoron. Yet he aspired, without 
ultimate success, to produce some kind of philosophical system. We now 
 
 
2 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Specimens of the Table Talk of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, second 
edition (London: John Murray, 1836), p. 308. This edition has a ‘Preface’ by Henry Nelson 
Coleridge. 
3 McFarland (ed.), Opus Maximum, vol. 15, Series LXXV. The editor’s ‘Prolegomena’ is 
divided into sections by capital Roman numerals, the page numbers are in lower case Roman 
numerals. See note 1 above on the Biographia Literaria as ‘a series of sketches’, P XXIX 
‘Aids to Reflection’, ccii. Some of McFarland’s references – but not all – will be to the text, 
or fragments of, the OM. McFarland’s ‘Prolegomena’ is magisterial, and I make use of it with 
full acknowledgement and with deep gratitude.  
4  See P IX ‘Naturphilosophie’. 
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have a clean text of the Opus Maximum and it does not realise Coleridge’s 
hope. It is full of interest, variety, and startling insights; and is worth reading. 
But like the Biographia Literaria material it does not add up to a draft-proof 
metaphysic. Opinions may differ, but that is mine, at least for now. 
To make Coleridge’s play with cogito and the I AM of Exodus 
tolerably intelligible I have simply borrowed a few passages from 
McFarland’s ‘Prolegomena’. Coleridge never asserts that cogito = I AM: at 
best he suggests – :: – a proportion between them. On this two things may be 
said: (1) God and humankind are both spiritual beings (as Coleridge 
thought), so even if there is an infinite distance between Coleridge and God, 
it is not a type distance;5 and, (2) Coleridge with his spider-like weaving of 
a – ‘would-be-argument’ – out of ‘the mind exerting all its powers’ that 
constitutes the working of the Biographia Literaria, Chapter XII, constitutes, 
equally, its workings and its not working. That is, the failing of the exercise. 
 
From Thomas McFarland’s Prolegomena: Indications of Coleridge’s 
Philosophical Method 
 
0) P V Reason and Understanding, “Reason and Religion are their own 
evidence”, lxiii : Reference, Lay Sermons (CC) 10. And ‘… 
CHRISTIAN FAITH IS THE PERFECTION OF HUMAN REASON 
(loc. cit.) Reference, Aids to Reflection (1825, 52). 
 
1) P V Reason and Understanding, “All that we can or need say is, that the 
existence of a necessary Being is so transcendentally Rational that it is 
Reason itself,” lxx. Reference Brinkley. [Brinkley; Brinkley, Roberta 
Florence (1892-1967) Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century.] The 
existence of God is given “unproblematic indeed.” Oddly Cardinal 
Newman thought something similar: “…two and two only supreme and 
supremely and luminously self-evident beings, myself and God.” 6 
 
 
 
5 See P V ‘Reason and Understanding,’ lvi. Note: Coleridge re-fashions Kant’s distinction 
between Reason and Understanding, this is of great importance in OM, but it is not to our 
present purposes (see P V, Reason and Understanding, lxvii) The ‘type identity’ is a difficult 
concept: See P V,lvi, footnote 83. 
6 John Henry Cardinal Newman (1801-1890), Apologia pro Vita Sua (1864), ‘History of my 
Religious Opinions to the Year 1833’. On 13 October 2019 Newman was canonised, so St 
John Henry Newman.  
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2) P XV Problem and Motive, “The Fall is a necessary Postulate of 
Science”, cii and ciii. Of ‘Science’ indeed, before it moved well away 
from metaphysics: perhaps. 
 
3) P XVIII Subject and Object, “We begin with the I KNOW MYSELF, in 
order to end with an absolute I AM. We proceed from the SELF, in order 
to lose and find all self in God.” Reference BL CC I 283. See OUP vol. 
I pp.185-186; EI p.146; EII p. 154. Bold added.) (See also OUP vol. II 
p.212 n; EI p.329n; EII p.284n.) P p.cxix. 
 
McFarland comments on this well-known portion of the Biographia 
Literaria: 
Even as he is repeating Schelling’s identity-formula of the coalescence of 
subject and object in the absolute he is also struggling to extricate his own 
authentic line [the ‘We begin…] with’ cited above].¶ But this understanding 
is still liminal in the Biographia Literaria; it occurs in the same paragraph 
in which Coleridge expressly adheres to Schelling’s ‘either/or’: ‘it must be 
remembered that all these Theses refer to the two Polar Sciences, namely 
to that which commences with and rigidly confines itself within the 
subjective, leaving the objective to natural philosophy, which is its opposite 
pole’ P XVIL, Subject and Object, cxxix-cxxx: Reference BL (ccli 281-2).
7
  
To all this I add that the Idealists’ attempt to wire ‘cogito’ and ‘I notice my 
cogito’ to the ‘I AM’ of Exodus is futile. The philosophical ‘wire’ just blows 
its fuse. (In 1817 I doubt that the fuse was even a notion in real science of 
the day: a pity).8 Coleridge might have needed his own, “In other words 
philosophy would pass into religion, and religion became inclusive of 
philosophy.” It does with him: had he any misgivings? It depends on how 
one reads the last two sentences of Thesis IX. In Table Talk for 1 November 
1833 we find “… none but one – God – can say ‘I am I’ or ‘That I am’.” 
 
4) P McFarland writes, “It was not in the relation of ‘thing to thing’ that 
Coleridge came to base his hopes for the philosophical validation of 
Christianity but in the realm of ‘the mind exerting its powers, unaided, 
on such facts alone as are found within its own consciousness’.” [Italic 
added.] Quote from P XX Philosophical Fulcrum, cxxxvi. The reference 
is to OM Fragment 2 f i. This remark is perhaps the key to, (a) the 
 
 
7 Thesis IX OUP vol. I p.185; EI p.146; EII p.153 & 153n. 
8 As well as a mention of Sir Humphrey Davy, Table Talk has references to magnetism, 
electricity and galvanism, nitrous oxide, heat, alchemy and astrology. A mixed bag of topics. 
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method used in the philosophical part of BL and, (b) the reason for the 
failure of the BL philosophical excursus. 
 
5) P XXIV Conservations, clxv “I cannot conceive a supreme moral 
intelligence unless I believe in my own immortality,” Coleridge in 
response to St Paul I Corinthians 15-19. Does belief here trump reason/ 
understanding? 
 
6) P XXV Evolutionary Materialism, “I have ever thought… Atheism is 
the next best religion to Christianity” clxxi. Also, “Did philosophy 
commence with an “it is” instead of an I am Spinoza would be altogether 
true,” XXV. Evolutionary Materialism clxxiii. (Coleridge revered 
Spinoza, but could not accept his pantheism.) 
 
7) P XXV Evolutionary Materialism, clxxiv, McFarland writes: “It was to 
avoid the danger of pantheistic identification of God and nature that 
Coleridge … [engaged in] his exploration of ‘facts that have their sole 
being in consciousness’. (Reference OM Fragment 2 f 62.) To which 
one may add the next quotation on the same page.  
 
7a) McFarland writes: “His endeavor was a ‘seeking for the first principles 
of all living & effective truth in the constitution and constant faculties 
of the Mind itself.” It was the depth of the “I am,” not the secrets of 
nature,9 that would ultimately provide Coleridge with what he needed, 
and at the same time obviated the ever-looming threat of pantheism. 
That he would find “That very principle, of which nature knows not, 
which the light of the sun can never reveal which we must either despair 
of finding or must seek and find within ourselves” (OM Fragment 2 f 62) 
“That which we find in ourselves,” he said in an ultimate statement, is 
“the substance and life of all our knowledge. Without this latent 
presence of the ‘I am’, all modes of existence in the external world 
would flit before us with no greater depth, root, or fixture, than the 
image of a rock hath in a gliding stream.” P XXV ‘Evolutionary 
 
 
9 The Fall is not part of Natural Science. It is ‘due to’ Original Sin (St Augustine and Roman 
orthodoxy). I prefer John Henry Newman’s ‘… some aboriginal calamity’. For Coleridge the 
Fall was central to his theology. 
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Materialism’, clxxiv-clxxv and 7a. Italic added. Reference, Lay 
Sermons (CC78).10  
 
This set of quotations, shorn of their context as they appear in McFarland’s 
‘Prolegomena’ may seem to be, philosophically, unsupportable. Read in the 
‘Prolegomena’, they make sense as part of a would-be Idealistic System.11 
Coleridge was attempting to produce a systematic work on the pattern of 
Friedrich Schelling’s or Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s: he hoped, even to go one 
better than Kant himself. Quotation Zero looks to be both an axiom and a 
conclusion: hence, O.12 
Reading the quotes from McFarland one sees two things: (1) That 
the apparent solipsism13 of Coleridge alone with his thoughts is not as acute 
as it may at first sight seem; and (2) as McFarland notes in quotation 3, the 
philosophical parts of Chapters XII and XIII of Biographia Literaria are 
liminal. They are doorsteps into a grand system of which only an unfinished 
portion remains: a system which might very well interest such Idealists as 
are still in practice. Additionally, it is significant for an historian of ideas. 
My tedious analysis of Chapter XII below which – I reckon – shows 
Coleridge as going around in a circle, was written for students of literature 
who found Thesis I – XII Biographia Literaria unhelpful. Chapter XIII, does 
offer some ideas with literary traction: Chapter XII does not. 
Coleridge’s play in Chapter XII of the Biographia Literaria with 
René Descartes’ cogito and the ‘I AM’ of Exodus is: (a) a trifle solipsistic, 
and, (b) suggests that the promise, of quotations 4 and 7 & 7a are vain: “… 
the mind exerting its powers unaided… on such facts alone as are found in 
its own consciousness…” never delivered for Coleridge a metaphysical 
system. He was fascinated by the fact that the mind can be both subject – 
 
 
10 These last two quotations – if you had read them before you encountered the philosophical 
parts of the Biographia – would have demystified you in advance. 
11 John H. Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher (London and New York: Allen and Unwin/ 
Humanities Press, 1930). Muirhead very much approved of Coleridge, crediting him as stating 
“… the fundamental principle of all later idealistic philosophy,” p. 77. See also pp. 243-244. 
Muirhead had more limited access to the Coleridge Manuscripts than did McFarland, 
nevertheless, his Coleridge as Philosopher remains a useful work. 
12 See also XX ‘Philosophical Fulcrum’: “The mind exerting its powers unaided on such facts 
alone as are found within its own consciousness,” reference Frag 2 f 1. See also XXV 
‘Evolutionary Materialism’, the last paragraph of page clxxiv as already cited as 7a in the 
borrowings from McFarland. 
13 Considering Coleridge’s “apparent solipsism,” how far was he from Fichte whom he 
burlesqued in BL Ch. IX? (OUP1 p.101n, EI p.78n, II p.86n). 
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cogito – and object ‘I notice my cogito’: That it can be self-reflective. One 
feels that he expected to get more out of that fact than can be gotten. 
In the critique of Thesis I – XII, I stipulate that Descartes’ cogito is 
an absolute. Putting aside ergo sum one might write “I think and I notice – 
am aware of – my act of thinking.” By turning cogito… into a simple self-
reflection we bring it closer to what I take to be Coleridge’s notion. This will 
do to make it, in context, an absolute; and the I AM of Exodus is the utterance 
of an Absolute Being.14 ‘God is Ens super Ens, the Ground of all Being… 
He is but therein likewise absolute being, in that he is the Eternal Self-
Affirmant & the I AM…’ [Italic added] P XVII Subject and Object, cxxiv. 
Reference, (CC) Coleridge Marginalia.15 God must be at once the absolute 
person and the ground of all personality (P ‘The Concept of Person’, cxv xvi. 
Reference OM Fragment 2 f 189). And a necessary Being (P VI ‘The Higher 
Criticism’ lxxi. Ref. Brinkley 128) 
The Biographia Literaria was conceived by Coleridge as merely a 
series of “sketches.” Neither it nor the Aids to Reflection constitute a full and 
proper philosophical essay. See P XXIX “Aids to Reflection,” ccii. 
Coleridge’s philosophy is scattered about in various essays and so on. Ideally 
it was to be expressed fully in the Opus Maximum. We turn now to the 
philosophical tailpiece of the Biographia Literaria Volume I (1817) and see 
how that fares as philosophy. Coleridge himself though it fared badly. And 
he was right. 
 
  
 
 
14 Note the Jacobi reference in P “… the true God is a living God, who knows and wants, says 
to himself that I THAT I am: not a mere I and absolute Not-I” (V Reason and Understanding 
lxv: Reference Jacobi Werke II 61. 
Also note V “Reason and Understanding”, lxv “There is one heart for the mighty mass of 
Humanity, and every pulse in each vessel strives to beat in concert with it.” Coleridge, The 
Friend (CC) I 96. McFarland cites this as a Romantic trope rather than a philosophical claim. 
15 S.T. Coleridge Marginalia, ed George Whalley and H.J. Jackson (6 vols London & 
Princeton, 1980-2001) = cc XII. 
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An Analysis of the Philosophical Sections of Chapter XII of the 
Biographia Literaria 
 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge and ‘I am’ :: ‘I AM’16 
 
But if we elevate our conception to the absolute self, the great eternal I AM, 
then the principle of being, and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality, the 
ground of existence, and the ground of the knowledge of existence, are 
absolutely identical. Sum quia sum; I am, because I affirm myself to be; I 
affirm myself to be, because I am.17 
The difficulty here lies in, “But if we elevate our conception to the absolute 
self, the great eternal I AM…” What does this elevation cash out as? Is 
Coleridge simply finding an analogy between his – or anybody’s – self-
affirmation and God’s? Or is he elevating himself as “I affirm myself to be,” 
to “I AM”? The Epigraph is from Scholium to the famous Thesis VI in 
Chapter XII of the Biographia Literaria, it is the second paragraph of that 
Scholium. It looks to be septic, but in his Footnotes Coleridge applies the 
antibiotics. 
I propose to examine Thesis VI of Chapter XII of the Biographia 
Literaria. I shall confine my arguments to: (i) the Scholium; and (ii) the 
footnote. However the whole Thesis VI needs to be quoted. But as the thesis 
begins “This principle” we need to go back to Thesis III before we go on to 
the puzzling Thesis VI. Thesis III sets out what “this principle” might be. 
Thesis III begins: 
THESIS III 
 
 
16 Note: The array :: is the – usual – proportion sign. The Oxford University Press (OUP) 
edition of the Biographia Literaria edited by J. Shawcross is in two volumes, from the 
reproduced edition of 1817. This contains an invaluable ‘Introduction’ and Notes. The OUP 
edition was first published in 1907 and has been reprinted; the 1954 edition has corrections. 
There are two ‘Everyman’ editions – EI London JM Dent & Co, New York, E.P. Dutton & 
Co with an I have made great use of vol. 15 the Opus Maximum ed. Thomas McFarland 
(Princeton University Press, 2002). I again acknowledge my debt to Professor McFarland. It 
is important to note in his P XVII, ‘Subject and Object’, cxxvii, the remark that Coleridge 
translated the opening of Schelling’s System des transzendentalen Idealismus without direct 
acknowledgement into Ch. XII of the Biographia Literaria. Muirhead remarks that “There 
was a period of (Coleridge’s) life at which he felt himself so much at once with Schelling’s 
philosophy that he was prepared to risk his reputation for literary honesty by adopting whole 
portions of its text as the basis of his own theory of poetry. See Muirhead, Coleridge as 
Philosopher, p. 53. 
17 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (OUP), vol. I, pp.183-184; EI, pp.145-146; 
EII, pp.150-152. 
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We are to seek … for some absolute truth capable of communicating to 
other positions [sic] a certainty that is not itself borrowed; a truth self-
grounded, unconditional and known by its own light…
18
 
The italics are mine, and the omission in the first line of the quotation is the 
word ‘therefore’. I do not intend to go through Thesis I and II. That that might 
be a useful thing to do I concede. However my point is to focus on Thesis 
VI, not Thesis III.  
Of Thesis III one might be tempted to say: Oh, Descartes’ cogito 
ergo sum yet again! This – after all – might well be taken for an absolute – 
Coleridge wants an absolute, but Descartes’ one is just what he does not 
want. Of course, Descartes’ cogito haunts Coleridge’s text – as it does much 
philosophy: and it is an ‘absolute’ in some sense of that word. Coleridge’s 
mentions of Descartes occur very often in the Biographia. One suspects that 
there is a tension – always there – between Coleridge’s absolute(s) and 
Descartes’. 
   THESIS VI 
This principle, [some absolute truth] and so characterized, manifests itself 
in the SUM or I AM, which I shall hereafter indiscriminately express by 
the words spirit, self and self-consciousness19. In this, and in this alone 
object and subject, being and knowing, are identical, each involving and 
supposing the other. In other words, it is a subject which becomes a 
subject by the act of constructing itself objectively to itself; but which 
never is an object except for itself, and only so far as by the very same act 
it becomes a subject. It may be described therefore as a perpetual self-
duplication of one and the same power into object and subject, which pre-
suppose each other, and can exist only as antitheses. 
 
SCHOLIUM. If a man be asked how he knows that he is, he can only 
answer, sum quia sum. But if (the absoluteness of this certainly having 
been admitted) he be again asked how he the individual person, came to 
be, then in relation to the ground of his existence, not to the ground of his 
knowledge of that existence, he might reply, sum quia deus est, or still 
more philosophically, sum quia in deo sum. 
Here this absoluteness which I have Italicized has a Cartesian ring to it. The 
“sum quia deus est” any Christian believer – and Coleridge was very much 
one – might answer to the question, “How do you know that you are: and 
what is the ground of you?” The reply would be ‘cogito’ and ‘God made me’: 
 
 
18 Coleridge, OUP, vol. I p.180; EI p.143; EII p.150. Bold and Italics added. 
19 See Patrick Hutchings, ‘S.T. Coleridge and the Desolation of Aesthetics’, Philosophical 
Studies, vol. XV (1966), pp. 7-27. The superscript indicates the point at which I criticized 
Coleridge. This article, much of which deals with a now dated controversy, is not, I think, 
available on the Internet. 
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But as is seen below, Coleridge makes the latter answer unclear by invoking 
Paul, Acts 17:28. 
We come now to the second paragraph of the Scholium, the one used 
as the epigraph to the present article. Coleridge’s second paragraph is the 
philosophically and theologically disturbing one: 
But if we elevate our conception to the absolute self, the great eternal I AM, 
then the principle of being, and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality, the 
ground of existence, and the ground of the knowledge of existence, are 
absolutely identical. Sum quia sum; I am, because I affirm myself to be; I 
affirm myself to be, because I am.20 
The difficulty here lies in, ‘But if we elevate our conception to the absolute 
self, the great eternal I AM…’ what does this elevation cash out as? Is 
Coleridge simply finding an analogy between his – or anybody’s – self-
affirmation and God’s? Or is he elevating himself as ‘I affirm myself to be’, 
to ‘I AM’?21  
In a footnote Coleridge makes the important distinction between ‘I 
am’ and ‘I AM’: does the elevation eliminate the distinction? Or does it leave 
it intact? Here I cannot entirely put off the hermeneutics of suspicion. 
However, one gives Coleridge the benefit of the doubt, one which he is at 
pains to clear up, in a footnote, which for clarity’s sake has been reduced in 
type-size more or less to echo Coleridge’s printed text. It reads: 
It is most worthy of notice, that in the first revelation of himself, not 
confined to individuals, indeed in the very first revelation of his absolute 
being, Jehovah at the same time revealed the fundamental truth of all 
philosophy, which must either commence with the absolute, or have no 
fixed commencement; i.e. cease to be philosophy…22 
Descartes’ cogito (ergo sum) is an absolute: and it is very much a beginning. 
Coleridge does not like the ergo sum ‘conclusion’ from cogito: but if one 
needs an absolute to begin with, a ‘bare’ cogito might serve. ‘Cogito ergo 
sum’ is altogether more elegant than the ramshackle arguments which 
Descartes seeks to balance on it. It is a neat self-affirmation. It is a neat 
absolute. It is not – as Descartes very well knew – the absolute of Absolute 
Being, ‘I AM’. Coleridge himself knew this, but… 
What one is uneasy about is whether – for all his drawing the 
distinction in his footnote – Coleridge elides the immense distance between 
 
 
20 Vol. I (OUP), vol. I, pp. 183-184; EI, pp. 145-146; EII, pp.151-152. My 
Italics on the word ‘absolutely’ is a trifle more than an irony. 
21 See above quotation 3 from McFarland and my comment on it. 
22 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (OUP), vol. I pp.183-184; EI pp.144-145; 
EII p.152. Bold and italics added. 
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self-affirmation=cogito, and ‘I AM’. The latter part of the footnote is very 
important. It reads: 
Here then we have, by anticipation, the distinction between the conditional 
finite I (which as known in distinct consciousness by occasion of experience 
is called by Kant’s followers the empirical I) and the absolute I AM, and 
likewise the dependence or rather the inherence of the former in the latter; 
in whom ‘we live, and move, and have our being,’ as St Paul divinely 
asserts, [Acts 17:28] differing widely from the theists of the mechanical 
school (as Sir I. Newton, Locke, etc.) who must say from whom we had our 
being, and with it life and the powers of life.23  
What does Coleridge mean by inherence? If we are, in any way, ‘in’ God we 
still are not God, and are not Absolute. It is not possible to be Absolute by 
osmosis. Acts 17-28 “…in him we live, and move and have our being…” 
does not, with its ‘in’ imply an osmosis. 
Coleridge had written earlier in Chapter XII, “The postulate of 
philosophy, and at the same time the test of philosophical capacity, is no 
other than the heaven-descended KNOW THYSELF.”24 Knowing oneself is 
not altogether easy: knowing that one is not God is. Coleridge’s footnote 
indicates that he knew this very well: his text however seems, to me at least, 
to smudge it. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus at 5.63 
reads, “I am my world,” but this itself is not as septic as it seems. Perhaps 
the same can be said of Coleridge’s Thesis VI in the end. The niggle is: 
Coleridge read Kant: but he also read Schelling, a very Master of Illegitimate 
Idealism and borrowed from him, as is well known. 
In Thesis IX Coleridge clears himself of all hermeneutic suspicion: 
à propos the Scholium of Thesis VI. He writes: 
THESIS IX 
We are not investigating an absolute principium essendi; for then, I admit, 
many valid objections might be started against our theory; but an absolute 
principium cognoscendi. The result of both the sciences, or their equatorial 
point, would be the principle of a total and undivided philosophy, as for 
prudential reasons I have chosen to anticipate in the Scholium to Thesis VI 
and the note subjoined. In other words, philosophy would pass into religion, 
and religion become inclusive of philosophy. We begin with the I KNOW 
MYSELF, in order to end with the absolute I AM. We proceed from the 
self, in order to lose and find all self in GOD.25 
 
 
23 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (OUP), vol. I p. 184; EI p. 145; EII p. 152. 
24 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (OUP), vol. I p. 173; EI p. 136; EII p. 144. 
25 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (OUP), vol. I pp.185-186; EI p.146; EII 
p.154. Bold added. See also OUP vol. II p.212n; EI p.329n; EII p.284n. 
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Is Coleridge here giving the wrong reading of the ‘in’ in St Paul’s ‘In whom 
we live and have our being’? I fear so. If he is not giving an over-strong 
reading, Thesis IX may be all right and proper for one who had considered 
being a clergyman of the Unitarian persuasion, but became a firm defender 
of the Anglican Church and its doctrines: One moves from self-knowledge 
to ‘the absolute’. Schelling haunts this passage, one fears. However: how 
does Coleridge get from ‘I am’ to ‘I AM? Even Thomas Aquinas needed five 
ways! Coleridge seems to rise too easily from a relative I am (cogito) to an 
absolute I AM: from a cogito absolute, to an absolute I AM, from a to A, 
where the absolutes are distinct (a) in type,26 and (b) in ontology. God is the 
Necessary Being. But we are not-Necessary. 
In Italicizing or putting in bold ‘absolute’ in quotations from 
Coleridge I hover between, on the one hand philosophy and on the other 
hermeneutics and literary criticism. In the very footnote which lets Coleridge 
off the hook – the one in which he exculpates himself from the imputation 
that he does reckon that: cogito ≡ I AM – Coleridge, just possibly, hankers 
for the very a/Absolute which he cannot have. Here, again, is part of the 
footnote which shows us precisely what Coleridge was hankering for: here, 
again, is the crux: 
It is most worthy of notice, that in the first revelation of himself, not 
confined to individuals, indeed in the very first revelation of his absolute 
being, Jehovah at the same time revealed the fundamental truth of all 
philosophy, which must either commence with the absolute, or have no 
fixed commencement; i.e. cease to be philosophy (bold and italic added). 
One cannot start a philosophy from I AM. Did Coleridge hope that he could? 
Descartes did not manage to erect everything that he wanted to on cogito 
ergo sum, for all that it is a small ‘a’ absolute. The consequent text of the 
Discourse on Method is a bricolage, but the beginning seemed hopeful. 
Coleridge in the short piece of the footnote quoted above seems either: (a) 
taking it from God/Revelation that philosophy must start from an absolute – 
if so whence this? Or, (b) did Coleridge yet-still-somehow imagine that ‘I 
AM’ answered our question ‘whence this?’? Did Coleridge think that I AM 
could be an a priori Absolute on which to build? Reading the Biographia 
Literaria one must keep one’s philosophical spectacles on, but at the same 
time accept – up to a point – a Poet’s ticket to indulge in ambiguity, and puns. 
 
 
26 I am in a quandary here: I have conceded that as souls we are of the same type as God in 
being – in part – spiritual beings. However, as Absolute (and as Necessary) God so outranks 
us that one seems to need to qualify ‘type’: or find another word. Perhaps Thomas Aquinas’ 
‘analogy’ is the best that can be found. 
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Coleridge needs an a/Absolute: he infers this from the absolute ‘I AM’s’ 
revelation of His Absolute-ness. A curious inference indeed. However the ‘I 
AM’ does not provide Coleridge with an absolute. Coleridge rejects 
Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, absolute: but he comes up with no absolute of 
his own. Stalemate! 
The philosophy of the British and American Absolute Idealists did 
not start from The Absolute: it got, laboriously, to it. This is particularly true 
of Francis Herbert Bradley. That it was not much use when got to is another 
matter, one which will not be gone into here. As for Schelling – that is 
another story into which I shall not go here. 
In the middle of the footnote quoted above (but not printed here), 
Coleridge takes Descartes’ cogito ergo sum apart. He makes the point often 
made since: sum being the necessary condition of cogito it is logically odd 
to derive the former from the latter. This done, Coleridge shows us that he 
does not make the mistake: of going directly from cogito, to I AM, because 
cogito and I AM are both – if differently – absolute. He writes, with a 
consequential ‘here’ on which I make no comment: 
… object and subject, being and knowing, are identical, each involving and 
supposing the other. In other words, it is a subject which becomes a subject 
by the act of constructing itself objectively to itself; but which never is an 
object except for itself, and only so far as by the very same act it becomes 
a subject. It may be described therefore as a perpetual self-duplication of 
one and the same power into object and subject, which pre-suppose each 
other, and can exist only as antitheses. 
The phrase ‘a perpetual self-duplication’ might look like a 
conflation of ‘I am’ and ‘I AM’, but the Scholium is reassuring: 
SCHOLIUM. If a man be asked how he knows that he is, he can only 
answer, sum quia sum. But if (the absoluteness of this certainly having been 
admitted) he be again asked how he the individual person, came to be, then 
in relation to the ground of his existence, not to the ground of his knowledge 
of that existence, he might reply, sum quia deus est, or still more 
philosophically, sum quia in deo sum. 
The sum quia deus est is orthodox: the sum quia in deo sum is Pauline: if 
prone to an Idealist misreading. However if I am quia in deo sum that does 
not allow me to assert of myself ‘I AM’. The best that I can do is: cogito 
(ergo sum). I am not an Absolute as is the utterer of ‘I AM’. Even if I am – 
in some sense – ‘in’ God I am not ‘I AM’. 
But if we elevate our conception to the absolute self, the great eternal I AM, 
then the principle of being, and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality, the 
ground of existence, and the ground of the knowledge of existence, are 
absolutely identical. Sum quia sum; I am, because I affirm myself to be; I 
affirm myself to be, because I am. 
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This may well be true: but – again – Coleridge cannot have the ‘I 
AM’ as his Absolute. And the phrase ‘absolutely identical’ gives Coleridge 
no ground on which to claim that he can find – his missing – absolute. By 
enrolling ‘I AM’ in his philosophy as, (a) its paradigm, ‘philosophy needs an 
absolute ground’, with this he gets nowhere, he achieves nothing. And, (b) 
his philosophy remains groundless. The best that he could do – but didn’t – 
is re-run cogito ergo sum. In fact, Descartes did not in fact get far – 
anywhere? – beyond that. The text of the footnote continues: 
Here then we have, by anticipation, the distinction between the conditional 
finite I (which as known in distinct consciousness by occasion of experience 
is called by Kant’s followers the empirical I) and the absolute I AM, and 
likewise the dependence or rather the inherence of the former in the latter; 
in whom ‘we live, and move, and have our being,’ as St Paul divinely 
asserts… (Acts 17:28).27 
Here, then, Coleridge shows himself to be in the totally respectable company 
of Kant: Kant, the philosopher who – virtually – quashed metaphysics and 
‘rational raving’.28 
The reader may agree with my judgement that Coleridge does not: 
(1) muddle his absolutes; (2) or recklessly take the Absolute I AM as a 
foundation for philosophy, or the reader may not agree with me. Coleridge 
 
 
27 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (OUP), vol. I p. 184; EI p. 145; EII p. 152. 
28 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (See CoJ Part I, 
‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgement’ in Book II, The analytic of the Sublime, p.128. Sidenumber 
275.) Kant’s topic here is “the inscrutability of the idea of freedom.” This is an issue still 
vexed. On the one hand, ordinary language’s locutions presume our knowledge/ ‘knowledge’ 
of our own freedom-of-will. In Oxford, in my day, ordinary language was put forward as 
solving the problem of freedom, while – at the same time – it was believed that language 
could not solve material mode problems. Brain science in the twenty-first century may take 
its own line on freedom/ ‘freedom’ – as Kant would have, more or less, expected – leaving 
freedom now ‘inscrutable’ because non-existent. This is not the place to settle this issue. 
However, Coleridge in Thesis VI may have had what Kant called in the freedom context: “… 
some VISION beyond all the bounds of sensibility; i.e. would dream according to principles, 
rational raving” (bold added). Poets may do this sort of thing in their philosophical moments, 
even? The whole of serious, philosophical aesthetics has before it the Question: metaphor, 
poetic ambiguity, analogy, or rational raving? One thinks of William Butler Yeats, Piet 
Mondrian, Wassily Kandinsky, Wallace Stevens and sundry poets, writers, painters too 
numerous to list. (See: T.H. Gibbons, Rooms in the Darwin Hotel, University of Western 
Australia Press, 1973.) Kant’s own noumenon itself “beyond all the bounds of sensibility” no 
longer seems, in the twenty-first century to do any work. We now tend to read Kant in a 
positivist way. Kant’s ‘thing-in-Itself’ one more or less ignores: it is too like John Locke’s 
“Primary v Secondary qualities.” It may, indeed, do even less work than do Locke’s pair. 
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has more to say in Thesis X which is still foundational. Or is a search for a 
foundation: 
THESIS X 
The transcendental philosopher does not inquire what ultimate 
ground of our knowledge there may lie out of our knowing, but 
what is the last in our knowing itself, beyond which we cannot 
pass. The principle of our knowing is sought within the sphere of 
our knowing. It must be something therefore which itself can be 
known. It is asserted only that the act of self-consciousness is for 
us the source and principle of all our possible knowledge. Whether 
abstracted from us there exists anything higher and beyond this 
primary self-knowledge, which is for us the form of all our 
knowing, must be decided by the result.29 
Here Coleridge may be referring to ‘is there a real world outside my 
consciousness?’ Or he may be in search of his Absolute: ‘result’ may just be 
ambiguous.  
The trouble is, as we have already noted, ‘the result’ is a fizzer. 
Coleridge never finds the absolute that he reckons he needs. Philosophy – he 
infers from the Absoluteness of I AM’ – must begin with an Absolute. 
However he never found it. And that, one reckons, is the end of the matter. 
 
Coleridge’s Imagination Primary and Secondary: I AM :: ‘Repetition” 
and ‘Echo’ 
Chapter XIII of the Biographia Literaria has, like Chapter XII, a strong 
reference to I AM: a stronger one, possibly more curious than that to be found 
in Chapter XII. In Chapter XII Coleridge footnotes himself into – relative – 
orthodoxy.30 Chapter XIII looks flighty by comparison. On the other hand 
Ch XIII has literary traction – of a sort. Chapter XII lacks any literary-critical 
use. 
 
Coleridge’s ‘Repetition’ and ‘Echo’ 
Coleridge in Thesis X of Chapter XII styles himself a ‘Transcendental 
Philosopher.’31 He has, in a footnote in Chapter XII, marked the/a distinction 
between the transcendental and transcendent,32 but he has not marked it quite 
 
 
29 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (OUP), vol. I pp. 186ff; EI p. 147; EII p. 154. 
30 The passage of Biographia Literaria which are under discussion may be found in the Oxford 
University Press edition, vol. I pp. 198-202 (the end of vol. I]; EI pp. 156-160; EII pp. 164-
167). The array :: is the – usual – proportion sign. 
31 OUP, vol. I p.186; EI p.147; EII p.154. 
32 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (OUP), vol. I p. 164; EI p. 159; EII p. 173. 
Philosophy in Coleridge 
Literature & Aesthetics 29 (2) 2019 153 
clearly enough. That becomes obvious when we come to the interesting part 
of Chapter XIII where it is the Transcendent which is up: this when Kant 
himself would have been careful to go no higher than the transcendental. 
Here is Coleridge: 
The IMAGINATION then, I consider either as primary, or secondary. The 
primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all 
human Perception33, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act 
of creation in the infinite I AM.34 
The crucial word here is ‘repetition’. In what sense does or could the ‘finite 
mind’ repeat ‘the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM’? At first reading 
it seems that Coleridge is too close to taking ‘infinite and finite’ in the God :: 
humankind context as, if not quite commensurable, at least as opposite ends 
of the one spectrum. God and humankind are type consistent in being 
S/spiritual. However no person is God except God. At second reading one 
may bluntly ask: “What have humankind ‘created’ to match ‘Creation’?” The 
answer must be fairly dusty. Poems, fictions, music, civilizations (prone to 
catastrophic rise, and mega-catastrophic fall) and, latterly, Natural Sciences 
which scrutinize Creation as they could not in Coleridge’s day, and this to 
marvellous effect. Among the results of such scrutiny is the atomic bomb 
which some idiot may well set off in the near future. Civilizations – tend to 
– rise only at the expense of ‘lesser’ ones: and the fall of the present One 
World Civilization – itself an absolute fiction probably – may end in the fall 
of the whole lot. “We’ll all go together when we go!” As c/Creators 
humankind do not find themselves in the same league as the ‘I AM’ of 
Exodus III 14. So ‘repetition’ in Coleridge’s text cashes out, to use an 
Irishism, at ‘a very low zero indeed!’ 
Or: one might take another view and compare the creativity of artists, 
in music, sculpture, painting etc. as ‘echoing’ the creativity of God. This 
view has been taken often enough. I shall here not argue for it; or against it. 
However it seems to be, (a) a metaphor, and (b), at once hackneyed, and 
expected to do more work than a metaphor can. Even the Thomist analogy 
notion, in which I once believed, I now find less convincing than once I did. 
However, one may have to fall back on it, and so on a different ontology. 
Kant’s transcendental Imagination ‘raised’ to the I AM, just collapses. As 
Kant would have warned Coleridge had they been colleagues. The 
transcendental is not the Transcendent – the latter needs the honorific capital 
 
 
33 This is Kantian and perfectly acceptable. However, it is ‘repetition’ at which one must cavil. 
34 Coleridge, Biographia Literaria (OUP), vol. I p. 202; EI p. 159; EII p. 167. Bold added. 
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‘T’ to mark the point. Coleridge is here embracing Schelling and not the more 
sober Kant. 
Finer than Schelling’s or Coleridge’s expression of the Romantic 
Imagination is Wordsworth’s:  
 Imagination, which, in truth, 
 Is but another name for absolute power 
 And clearest insight, amplitude of mind, 
 And Reason in her most exalted mood  
(The Prelude, bk. xiv, l. 190) 
The secondary imagination may go the way of the first – into a cloud of 
hyperbole –though something may be salvageable.  
The secondary [Imagination] I consider as an echo of the former, co-
existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with primary in the 
kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its 
operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; or where 
this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to 
idealize and to unify35. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) 
are essentially fixed and dead (bold added). 
What is salvageable is the part, “It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to 
re-create.” Ordinary experience is subjected to this process, and poetic 
‘creation’ (irony quotes and approval quotes) occurs. What literary critics 
have found useful is the section: “… at all events, it struggles to idealize and 
to unify…” Most Organic Unity talk in the Old-New Criticism could take off 
from here. And literary critics used to, and still can, use: ‘It is essentially 
vital, even as all objects are essentially fixed and dead’. 
Then, Coleridge goes on to mention ‘fancy’ and we are suddenly in 
the realm of the imagination v fancy, well known to literary critics and still 
of use to them, if they choose to take it up. You cannot mount a “Lit Crit 
nineteenth and twentieth century, 101” course without visiting this bit of the 
Biographia Literaria. Whether you still use it in your literary criticism is 
your choice. It has vernacular look-alikes: ‘He played the Diabelli Variations 
perfectly’; ‘It was a seamless performance’; ‘The performance of the choir 
was patchy.’ Our ordinary critical language uses Coleridge’s idea already. 
‘Their Hamlet was all over the place’; ‘The lecture was spot on, not a word 
out of place’; ‘I felt as though The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie was so well 
crafted that you could not alter a sentence in it’; ‘Frankenstein by Mary 
 
 
35 ‘To Idealize and to unify’ is an Idealist’s tautology. Idealists thought – correctly – that 
everything was related to everything else. They thought – incorrectly – that philosophy could 
make omni-relationship perspicuous. It can not. It is, however, an heuristic of natural science 
to seek, and eventually to find, a Unified Science.  
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Shelley is very uneven, but it’s so gripping that one does not mind this’; 
‘Wagner could have done with a good editor!’ 
Even if we do not have the Idealist’s passion for unity, we notice it 
when it is not there.36 Literary Criticism may have moved on from Coleridge: 
but it might well move back. Coleridge is part of the History of Ideas. And 
Postmodernism has been all too successful: it made straight the way for 
‘post-truth’ and ‘alternative facts’. These do not seem things with much of a 
future. And they are ‘a present danger’ if ever there was one. 
Chapter XII of the Biographia is small beer: for the extent of 
Coleridge’s philosophical ambitions, and for another taste of philosophical 
style the reader may be interested in the last section of the present paper 
below.37 
 
The Opus Maximum and the Development of “The Fragments of Truth” 
in The Biographia, Chapters XII and XIII 
  
The Style and Type of Coleridge’s Philosophy: “The Circle is Completing” 
Probably the most arresting remark made by Coleridge in the Table Talk is 
this from 15 October 1833: 
The Trinity – Incarnation – Redemption, 
The Trinity is the idea: the Incarnation, 
which implies the Fall, is the fact: 
The Redemption is the mesothesis 
of the two – that is – the religion.38 
One might argue in a contrarian way that the Fall ‘implies’ – that is makes 
necessary – the Incarnation. This remark from the Table Talk seems a too 
neat statement – a too neat account? – of the major mysteries of the Christian 
 
 
36 See Patrick Hutchings, ‘Organic Unity Revindicated?’ Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, Vol. XXIII, No. 3 (1965), in reply to Catherine Lord’s ‘Organic Unity 
Reconsidered’, JAAC XXII (1964), and her very considered ‘Kinds and Degrees of Aesthetic 
Unity’, British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 18, No.1 (1978). The whole question remains a 
question. 
37 Both Muirhead and McFarland deal fairly extensively with Coleridge’s adjustments to 
Aristotelian logic. This is beyond the scope of the present article. On the topic there are two 
books by Alice D. Snyder of which I have sighted only, Coleridge on Logic and Learning 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929). 
38 This is so pithy that one half expects a QED: a proof if only in one bit of Cambridge’s 
numerous amendments to Aristotelian logic. I shall have to reread the OM yet again. There is 
a great deal in it about the Trinity – in which Coleridge believed – but so far I have not found 
enough to make good the (implied) claim that TT Oct. 15, 1833 is more than a theological bon 
mot. 
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religion. It would indeed merit a metaphysic. It is not the case, nevertheless 
that the Opus Maximum gives us this saving philosophical justification of 
this pithy – but too pithy – item from the Table Talk. A few quotations from 
McFarland’s Prolegomena may show how Coleridge did his philosophy.  
McFarland writes in P XV Problem and Motive, cxii-cxiii: 
Coleridge’s inability to work at self-assigned tasks was devastating and his 
opium addiction filled him with self-loathing. In this massive context of 
woe, Coleridge found only one hypothesis that made sense of his situation: 
the Christian essential of the Fall of Man: “I profess a deep conviction that 
Man was and is a fallen Creature, not by accidents of bodily constitution, 
or any other cause, which human Wisdom in a course of ages might be 
supposed capable of removing; but diseased in his Will.” He placed the Fall 
of Man at the very summit of Christian truths, second only to faith in God 
himself: “Now next to the knowledge – for in this case Faith is Knowledge 
– of an Almighty God, the Father of Spirits…the most momentous truth is 
the Fact of a FALL, and that all the miseries of the World are the 
consequences of this Fall… .” If the dogma of the Fall of Man corresponded 
exactly to the facts of life as Coleridge himself experienced them, another 
Christian essential, that of redemption into a future blessedness, was equally 
ineluctable: “My Faith is simply this – that there is an original corruption 
in our nature, from which & from the consequences of which, we may be 
redeemed by Christ….and this I believe – not because I understand it, but 
because I feel, that it is not only suitable to, but needful for, may nature. 
Faith for some believers is so intensely felt that both exceeds understanding, 
and does not beg for any rationalization. Coleridge both felt and 
philosophized his faith. 
Indeed, few thinkers can have placed so much emphasis on the need for 
redemption as did Coleridge. “I have prayed with drops of agony on my 
Brow, trembling not only before the Justice of my Maker, but even before 
the Mercy of my Redeemer. ‘I gave thee so many Talents. What hast thou 
done with them’?” He speaks of “the two great Moments of the Christian 
Faith, ORIGINAL Sin (i.e., Sin, as the source of sinful actions) and 
Redemption; that the Ground, and this the Superstructure, of Christianity”. 
In July 1825 Coleridge says that “the Redemption of the World must needs 
form the best central Reservoir for all our knowledges39, physical or 
personal.” Certainly it formed the central reservoir that watered the 
conception and necessity of the Magnum Opus. 
 
 
39 This ‘knowledges’ perhaps reflects Coleridge’s never being quite clear about the difference 
between Naturphilosophie and real science. See above number 3 in the set of quotations 
borrowed from McFarland: “The Fall is a necessary Postulate of Science.” How Adam and 
Eve were responsible for the Earth’s being full of tectonic plates which cause earthquakes etc. 
I do not know. 
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The Magnum Opus was to be an ancilla – the usual ‘handmaid’ – of theology, 
and Faith. St Thomas Aquinas – whom Coleridge regarded as an ‘original 
mind’ – argued in a similar way, although he was not an Idealist, as was 
Coleridge. 
While his commitment to Christian fundamentals was deeply existential, 
Coleridge was intellectually aware that the truth of those fundamentals 
alone led to any theoretical meaning in human existence, and that they 
depended on the postulate of immortality. “If in this life only”, said St. Paul 
in a passage quoted by Coleridge, “we have hope in Christ, we are of all 
men most miserable”; “If there be no resurrection of the dead then is Christ 
not risen: And if Christ not be risen, then is our preaching vain, and your 
faith is also vain” (St Paul, 1 Corinthians 15 : 12-19). 
Coleridge is here in line with Christian Faith in general. Faith is always in an 
epistemological fix: Christ could rise from the dead once and once only. 
Doubting Thomas had empirical verification of the fact of the resurrection; 
we have not.40 
We easily see why Coleridge wanted the Fall, the first condition of 
his Redemption – a Redemption he needed, and this with great passion. But 
why does the Opus Maximum not show us the working out of the 15 October 
1833 notion? The 1833 text is so neat. It suggests that Coleridge might – 
somehow – explain the Trinity, show the Fall to be a necessary consequence 
of the Son’s being the Son. That the Incarnation was needful for the 
Redemption of humankind is familiar doctrine. For my own part I find as 
mysteries of Faith, The Trinity, and the Fall, mysteries indeed! Like the 
Greeks I find the Crucifixion-as-the-Atonement if not ‘folly’, at least not – 
fully or even partially – comprehensible41. Would the Opus Maximum open 
it all to – prosaic – reason? It would not and does not. Joseph Henry Green, 
Coleridge’s amanuensis and literary executor, did not publish the Opus 
Maximum but instead two volumes of Spiritual Philosophy based on 
Coleridge’s dictation to Green of the would-be ‘Great Work’ – the present 
Opus Maximum. In P of that work we find XXXIII ‘Spiritual Philosophy’, 
ccxxxix: McFarland writes: 
Green’s second volume is as faithful to central Coleridgean emphasis as the 
first, Chapter III is entitled “The Blessed Trinity”. Chapter IV, “The Fall 
 
 
40 I have kept McFarland’s footnote numbers to the new standard Collected Coleridge series: 
327 (Letters VI 940; 328 Ibid. XI; 329 Ibid. III 476; 330 V 406; 331 Ibid. V 481). I have however 
inserted the chapter and verse from St Paul, 1 Corinthians 15: 12-19. 
41 Paul, Corinthians I: 22-23. The Roman Catholic ‘explanation’ of the Atonement for the Fall 
as an act of ransom is a mere – unconvincing – metaphor. Here Faith gets little support from 
reason. Apologetics runs close to Apology. 
Philosophy in Coleridge 
158  Literature & Aesthetics 29 (2) 2019 
and the Redemption (though here one finds an apologetic note from the 
editor [Green] the “intended chapter of the Fall and Redemption had not 
been written out in readiness for publication…” (italic added). 
It would seem that Coleridge may not have been up to writing it. And Green 
was not confident that – even with all the dictations from Coleridge at hand 
– that he could fill the – here crucial – gap. 
There is yet another claim which Coleridge could not make good: Coleridge 
said in Table Talk, September 1, 1831: 
My system, if I may venture to give it so fine a name, is the only attempt, I 
know, ever made to reduce all knowledges into harmony. It opposes no 
other system, but shows what was true in each; and how that which was true 
in the particular, in each of them became error, because it was only half the 
truth. I have endeavoured to unite the insulated fragments of truth, and 
therewith to frame a perfect mirror. I show to each system that I fully 
understand and rightfully appreciate what that systems means; but then I lift 
up that system to a higher point of view, from which I enable it to see its 
former position, where it was indeed, but under another light and with 
different relations; - so that the fragment of truth is not only acknowledged 
but explained… 
There is more – but despite Coleridge’s vast erudition one does not reckon 
the task which he set himself was ever finished – even in the Opus Maximum: 
See P VII the “Magnum Opus” as System, lxxvi. 
 
Conclusion 
One must read – yet again – the Opus Maximum to see how much of this text 
is of more than historical interest in the twenty first century. One’s mind 
remains open, but the task is daunting. Coleridge had large and noble 
philosophical ambitions: and in their failure something noble remains. 
